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1. Introduction 
1.1. iRODS and Policy-Driven Data Management 
 
iRODS is the “Integrated Rule-Oriented Data System” (iRODS 2016).  This unique 
platform provides an abstraction of underlying storage technology accessible through a 
global logical name-space, a catalog that captures both system and user provided 
metadata, and a rule engine that can apply management policies triggered by events that 
occur in the grid. These event-triggered policies are termed policy enforcement points 
(Xu et al. 2017). Rules in iRODS can be composed of microservices, which are 
specialized components that encode a capability. The actions of rules and microservices 
alter the state of the data management environment. This state can be audited and 
evaluated in order to ascertain that policies are being appropriately enforced. This creates 
a complete, verifiable policy management environment. Policy domains are introduced in 
this project as a method of organizing these elements. Policy domains are a formalization 
of these interlinked elements, serving to encapsulate and unify policies and metadata as 
applied to a particular context. The policy domain encapsulates knowledge about how 
data is managed. Knowledge encapsulated in the policies (rules), capabilities 
(microservices), and state (metadata), applied for a particular purpose is the essence of a 
policy domain.   
 
The context in which policies are applied is key. Moore et al. focus on the purpose of a 
collection. They observe that policies are defined by the purpose that is the driving force 
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for a collection, representing “a consensus of the persons collaborating on a data 
management project” (Moore et al. 2015). This purpose defines the properties that must 
be maintained about the particular collection. In a sensor data sink application, properties 
could include calibration data, geo-spatial data, and time synchronization information. In 
an archival storage application, information about the history of an AIP, history of fixity 
checks and checksum information, and history of any storage migration would certainly 
be required. This constellation of polices and properties takes a different shape depending 
on various purposes. This link from purpose to properties to is central to the concept of 
policy domains. This diagram from Moore et al. encapsulates conceptual links between 
parts of a policy domain. 
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Figure 1. Reproduction of Figure 8 in Moore et al. - Policy Based Data Management 
Concept Graph (Moore et al. 2015) 
Policy-based data management systems exhibit common patterns across domains. The 
approach in this paper identifies these common patterns, creating an abstract framework. 
This framework can then be customized for a specific purpose through the incorporation 
of policies, properties, and capabilities that can be configured as a working unit with 
sensible initial defaults, open to enhancement by curators at a particular location. This 
paper discusses a formalization of a policy domain as a running system. The flexibility of 
the policy domains approach, and the limited assumptions about the internal details of the 
procedures and tools used in applying management policies it makes increase a policy 
domain’s usefulness in diverse contexts. 
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A policy domain is somewhat akin to a “class” in object-oriented design, acting as a 
template for representing the data and responsibilities of a certain abstract or concrete 
“thing”.  A class can be instantiated and utilized to carry out a particular task, or fulfill a 
certain purpose. A policy domain can also be thought of as an “archetype” as described 
by Beale. An archetype is a higher level of abstraction, a “model defining some domain 
concept, expressed using constraints on instance structures of an underlying reference 
model” (Beale, 2002).  
 
This project defines a functioning framework where subsections of an iRODS grid can be 
designated as representing a policy domain or archetype. The policy domain presents 
policy enforcement points as high-level, semantically rich events to which high-level 
policies may be attached. This linking is done through the implementation of a state 
machine that can transform low-level to high-level events and apply strict constraints that 
formalize how events are triggered and in what order. Policy sets can then be developed 
which represent these high-level policy enforcement points and integrate the properties 
and capabilities appropriate to the purpose. Policy domains are designed so that a larger 
system may be a network of cooperating policy domains. For the purposes of this project, 
essential elements of a single policy domain system will be developed in a way that can 
support this coarse-grained componentization. The problem investigated is the Open 
Archival Information Systems (OAIS) model for a digital preservation environment. This 
approach builds on the past success of the iRODS architecture and closes a significant 
gap in the applicability of policy sets, providing an enhanced mechanism for encoding 
knowledge in a data management environment. OAIS is a particularly useful prototype as 
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policy domains have characteristics that can be leveraged to produce a trustworthy and 
verifiable digital preservation environment. 
1.2. Trusted Digital Preservation 
 
Digital preservation is a long-studied area of information science. Recent efforts have 
focused on the specification and development of systems to preserve digital information 
with an assurance of trust. Rosenthal noted that “digital preservation systems have a 
simple goal, that the information they contain remain accessible to users over a long 
period of time” (Rosenthal et al. 2005). Rosenthal described many threats to digital data 
including hardware and software failure and obsolescence, as well as a variety of human 
and system level errors. Preservation systems must provide capabilities to counter a 
variety of threats. Beyond mere preservation of data streams, Hedstrom focused on the 
need to preserve the significant properties of digital objects so that they may be 
understood and utilized by a community of interest. This includes descriptive data as well 
as data that expresses the structure of a digital object composed of multiple data streams 
(Hedstrom et al. 2002). Chowdury (2010) distinguished between passive and active 
management, noting digital preservation systems must proactively manage the data 
streams, and must actively keep them accessible. Simple replication and backup were 
seen as an insufficient approach. Beagrie (2008) stressed the importance of active 
management, pointing out that this distinguishes digital preservation environments from 
“digital mortuaries”. 
 
Duranti focused on two key aspects of preservation, the reliability of digital records and 
their authenticity. These concerns are addressed through the application of management 
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policies, and through the preservation of metadata and state information that prove that 
the digital objects are what they claim to be. Duranti went on to say that digital 
preservation solutions, “many of which center on migration and emulation, are unrealistic 
and focus too heavily on narrow aspects of the problem: they are the kinds of solutions 
that we have described previously as artisan” (Duranti 1995). In order to be flexible and 
generalizable, solutions must consider many focus areas and take a comprehensive view 
of the full lifecycle of digital objects as well as the full range of functional requirements 
implied by the goal of long term digital preservation with reliability and authenticity. 
 
Innocenti et al (2011) pointed out that “in order for digital curation to be continuous, 
scalable, interoperable, dynamic and automated, one of the key points would be to 
substantially improve the ways we describe, represent and manage the objects themselves 
and their context”. Moore points out that the context is not only embodied in the data 
streams and metadata in an archive, it is also embodied in the policies that manage data 
themselves. Systems that can describe policies in computer actionable rules are thus 
capturing and representing knowledge. Other methods of representing knowledge in an 
archive include provenance and descriptive metadata, information describing workflows 
applied to data objects, and microservices that interact with external data sources (Moore 
2013). Policy domains are a refinement and organization of these forms of knowledge 
embodied in a preservation system, applying constraints on the application of this 
knowledge, and defining rich state information that precisely records the provenance of a 
particular data object.  
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Efforts in the 1990’s in the area of digital preservation focused on standards for 
describing digital preservation systems (CCSDS 2002). A significant effort was 
undertaken by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration to deal with 
valuable space data. This effort resulted in the formation of the Consultative Committee 
for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) and the eventual development of the Open Archival 
Information Systems (OAIS) model of a digital preservation environment, an ISO 
standard. Lee et al. (2007) stressed that the OAIS is actually a reference model, and is 
thus implementation independent. A detailed specification of how to implement a digital 
preservation environment is not provided in OAIS.  
 
OAIS describes a system that carries out several archival functions, including: 
• Ingest 
• Archival storage 
• Data management 
• Access 
• Dissemination 
OAIS provides a simple model for a digital repository, where Producers provide 
information to the archive, Management represents the policies applied to the archive, 
and Consumers access data in the archive. OAIS proposes the concept of an information 
object that contains the relevant data stream as well as the significant properties for a 
relevant community. The trustworthiness and utility of a digital object relies on what 
OAIS terms Preservation Description Information, or PDI, similar to Moore’s concept of 
knowledge that must be captured in the preservation environment. 
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In OAIS, the ingest -> archival storage -> dissemination data flow maps onto different 
models of information object at each state. These are, respectively, the SIP (Submission 
Information Package), the AIP (Archival Information Package), and the DIP 
(Dissemination Information Package). The various functional entities in OAIS are related 
in the following figure from the reference model (CCDS 2002). 
 
 
Figure 2. From Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems / Reference Model for 
an Open Archival Information System (CCSDS 2002) 
 
This figure combines the Producer - Management - Consumer context, and notes the flow 
of data through the archive, with the information object representation at each stage. 
Arrows in this case are highlighting a conceptual data flow, rather than a rigorous 
depiction of the sequences, events, and constraints. In OAIS, policies are detached from 
the data flows, and represented here as conceptually unrelated areas of administration, 
data management, and preservation planning. Our policy domain model brings these 
policies into the core representation. 
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At each of the points in the main data flow, OAIS highlights roles and responsibilities. 
For ingest, key responsibilities include validation and verification, data formatting, and 
production of an information object suitable for preservation. For archival storage, 
preservation actions like format migration, failure detection and prevention, and other 
periodic preservation actions are indicated. For access or dissemination, this can include 
various access controls, and production of information objects in response to consumer 
requests, often in a form tailored to the nature of the request. These roles, as well as the 
responsibilities of the management functions, provide guidance on the nature of policies 
that would characterize a compliant preservation environment. 
 
Beyond the functional description of digital archives, there is a large body of research in 
defining and measuring trustworthiness. Research Libraries Group and Online Computer 
Library Center took the OAIS Reference Implementation as a starting point to investigate 
trustworthiness. Emphasis was placed on the processes required to audit and certify 
trustworthiness (Beagrie et al. 2002). The Research Libraries Group stressed the long-
term viability of digital objects, methodologies for evaluation of a repository, and 
auditable and measurable policies to carry out the diverse responsibilities necessary. The 
Research Libraries Group defined a wide array of organizational and technical 
requirements, including sustainability measures. Jantz and Giarlo enumerated specific 
technical measures that enable trust in a preservation environment. These include digital 
signatures, persistent identifiers and audit trails (Jantz Giarlo 2005). They asserted that 
transformations and migration events should result in precise preservation metadata. 
 
 11 
Moore (2008), in his “Theory of Digital Preservation” took a holistic view of 
trustworthiness. He described microservices in the iRODS system as the “minimal set of 
preservation functions”. These preservation functions are combined through rules to 
describe a “self-consistent” set of capabilities. In this model, these capabilities are 
automated as reactive processes or through periodic invocation. The effects of these 
operations must be recorded as state or metadata. Assessment criteria can then be 
developed to make assertions against this recorded state, yielding a trusted system. This 
idea was amplified by Smith and Moore who mapped recorded preservation state in an 
archive against the PREMIS standard, noting that a complete mapping of preservation 
state to an appropriate community assessment standard creates a “closed system”. Smith 
and Moore noted “when the system is closed, that is, an assessment criterion has been 
defined for each preservation metadata attribute, and a set of preservation metadata exists 
for each assessment criterion, one can expect the system to provide self-consistent 
preservation management. We believe this methodology can ultimately lead to 
implementations of preservation environments that are provably self-consistent” (Smith 
Moore 2008). Downs and Giaretta identified elements of trusted repositories that map 
neatly onto Smith and Moore’s model. They identified workflows to carry out the 
requirements of the preservation environment, synonymous with Smith and Moore’s 
focus on rules and capabilities. They also introduce the concept of assessment, though not 
directly linked to recorded state metadata (Downs et al. 2014). 
 
These efforts have culminated in the ISO 16363, the Audit and Certification of 
Trustworthy Digital Repositories standard, a formalization of the TRAC standard 
developed in 2007. This standard covers many aspects, organizational and technical, and 
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presents a set of criteria that, when subjected to a successful audit, will certify a 
repository as trustworthy (Rodrigues et al. 2014). Rodrigues et al. carried out an audit of 
twenty-six repositories using ISO 16363, on a 1-5 scale of maturity, and found a general 
level of maturity that was around the “3.0” level, indicating a “formative” or “in 
implementation” status. It appears that this area presents an opportunity for advancement.  
1.3. iRODS as a Platform for Trusted Preservation 
 
Before delving into the details of this project, it is important to understand policy based 
data management in the iRODS system. iRODS is a mature open source data grid that 
carries out four main functions (iRODS 2016). These are data virtualization, data 
discovery, workflow automation, and secure collaboration. The qualities of iRODS 
provide necessary technical capabilities that fulfill many basic needs of a digital 
preservation environment. Data virtualization means that the underlying storage 
technology where data objects are stored can be any type of technology, including cloud 
data stores. A data grid can be a heterogeneous mix of storage technology, but always 
presents a uniform interface. This allows storage migration and protection from technical 
obsolescence. This also allows replication and the assignment of a stable logical path for 
every collection and data object. Data discovery is shorthand for metadata capabilities. 
Metadata can be used to provide structure, record provenance, and preserve significant 
properties related to data objects. These capabilities also enable the maintenance of 
permanent identifiers and other requirements of a digital repository. Workflow 
automation is synonymous with policy management of data, through microservices 
invoked by rules, and responding to policy enforcement points. The automatic invocation 
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of rules through policy enforcement points is a key iRODS feature that this project aims 
to extend. 
 
iRODS has its roots in digital preservation, given the long-standing relationship between 
iRODS and the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. However, it is 
important to note that the notion of policy is broadly applicable. A good deal of emphasis 
in the past few years has been on the role of policy in managing scientific data, especially 
for reproducible research (Moore Rajasekar 2014). This is a useful reminder that, even 
though the emphasis in this project is digital preservation, the proposed policy domain 
mechanisms can organize and apply policy for many purposes. This notion of the link 
between purpose and policy is highlighted by Moore, Rajasekar, and Wan (2010), who 
stressed that “the decision to preserve data is typically driven by an over-riding purpose 
that determines the properties that the records should possess”.  
 
Hedges et al. (2008) implemented a preservation system at CeRch that embodied many of 
the theoretical principles of policy-based preservation systems using the existing iRODS 
capabilities, particularly as applied to ingest and AIP storage. Their system is described 
by this figure from their 2008 paper: 
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Figure 3. From M. Hedges et al. (2008) / Future Generation Computer Systems 
 
CeRich ingest included integrity and verification checks, as well as preservation actions, 
like transforming file formats to a preservation-ready standard. The implementation used 
iRODS rules with conditions, so that multiple rules that responded to the same policy 
enforcement point could be defined for different purposes, and so that condition checking 
would fire the proper rule for the appropriate abstract phase of the preservation workflow. 
Hedges found that event-based triggering of policies encoded as rules was a successful 
strategy in prototype, but noted that a production implementation would encounter a 
higher level of complexity that would require a great deal of effort. Hedges noted the 
difficulties involved in binding their system to the policy enforcement points, which 
presented some level of impedance mismatch. In addition, achieving consistency was a 
barrier. Hedges noted “there is no automated way of checking the rule base, so 
dependencies, duplications and inconsistencies may be introduced by the designers, 
particularly in a federated environment where multiple rule sets may be operative” 
(Hedges 2002). 
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iRODS has been used as the basis for a formal effort to define policies that automate 
much of the ISO 16363 standard. This effort by Moore et al. (2017) identified in great 
detail the policies, metadata, and assessment criteria needed to certify a repository as 
trusted under the ISO 16363 standard. This review specified metadata values to capture 
preservation state, defined micro-services that encapsulated necessary preservation 
capabilities, and defined reporting and audit information that could be used to produce a 
certification of trustworthiness. The key components of Moore et al. were: 
• Management documents in compliance with the standard 
• Repository parameters and global variables 
• Metadata attributes to capture preservation state 
• Audit mechanisms (for assessment) 
• Policies to manage data 
There raw materials map neatly onto the preservation capabilities, state, and assessment 
criteria in the “Theory of Digital Preservation”. The central question of this project is the 
manner in which the relationship between the policies and the state reflecting the actions 
of those policies are linked, and whether there are intrinsic mechanisms that are missing 
in the underlying technology that can more explicitly describe the preservation state and 
the policies that manage that state. 
 
The notion of policy sets, a complete set of policies and resulting state metadata, has 
already been offered. This would enable iRODS to be easily configured to serve the 
common needs across different domains in a pluggable fashion. The advantage of human 
readable, high-level policies, and mechanisms for declarative binding and dynamic 
resolution of policies has been another area of investigation. iRODS currently encodes 
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policy in rules written in one of the supported iRODS rule languages (iRODS 2017). 
These rules contain conditions that determine when they should run, and are configured 
in server configuration files. The current practice has been to utilize conditions and the 
ability to specify multiple rule implementations for a policy enforcement point so that 
non-necessary rules will fail and yield to other rules until a rule successfully fires. 
Conway et al. (2011) experimented with an approach for dynamic policy binding and 
resolution to create a more user friendly, accessible form, allowing a curator to 
declaratively bind a policy to a particular collection through metadata. This project, titled 
“Arch” created a prototype of an interface-driven, archivist oriented tool: 
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Figure 4. Arch Interface (Conway, Ward, de Torcy 2011) 
 
Preservation capabilities in microservices were mapped through metadata to higher level 
abstractions. These human readable capabilities could be stored in a preservation 
environment, and then composed into policy templates. These policy templates could be 
set with defaults and then overridden for particular collections. A dynamic resolution 
mechanism would fire at policy enforcement points to discover and invoke applied 
policy. This prototype successfully demonstrated the overall architecture, however, it was 
 18 
limited to a particular part of the OAIS data flow, ingest of a SIP in a staging area. This 
was a limitation of the Arch model, as the authors noted: 
An important conceptual exercise to further define a bridge between high-level 
policy and computer-actionable rules within iRODS would be a mapping of 
events in an archive to the policies that pertain to that particular event at an 
abstract level. This will be most important in any elaboration of a “policy 
resolution” component that recognizes such an event, resolves the applicable 
policy, and applies the policy at the correct time within iRODS...Limiting the 
prototype to a subset of the ingest process allowed us to proceed in development, 
but the lack of such conceptual event mapping is a significant limitation to 
creating a generalizable solution (Conway et al. 2011). 
 
Arch suffered from an inability to recognize the semantic meaning of a low-level storage 
event. Mapping high-level abstractions onto low-level policy enforcement points created 
a brittle system, where the knowledge about the meaning of a low-level storage event, 
such as the creation of a file, was encoded within the rule conditions. This is particularly 
hard to manage as complexity increases. 
 
In response to these findings, Ward, Xu, and Conway (2013). developed the notion of a 
policy domain. In the case of Arch, this mechanism could recognize that a “postProc” 
that fires when a data object is added to a collection maps to the deposit of a SIP into a 
staging area for ingest. A state machine was introduced as a central part of a policy 
domain. Through the application of a state machine, a policy domain can receive low-
level events from policy enforcement points and utilize the knowledge of the current state 
and the possible transitions to trigger the appropriate action, and to signal that action as a 
new high-level policy enforcement point appropriate to the context. This is not simply a 
refactoring of the responsibility for firing a policy from an iRODS rule condition to an 
external service, the proposed inclusion of a state machine as the underlying policy 
resolution mechanism was recognized to offer several significant benefits.  
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The introduction of a state machine brings formalism into the heart of the design. A state 
machine not only defines a consistent structure for preservation metadata, it also 
constrains the preservation metadata to a certain set of possible states. Measuring the 
state of a data object and making assertions about the conformity of the preservation 
environment is thus greatly simplified. The authors noted “Our approach makes the 
assessment of the preservation state of the archive amenable to formal, automated 
validation via state transition events metadata” (Ward Xu Conway 2013). This project 
applies these insights and general principles and attempts to synthesize these ideas of 
trusted digital preservations into an operating system that can be practically developed 
and deployed as a software package. The design process begins with a discussion of the 
elements and principles applied in the system design, and the discussion continues with 
an outline of the actual implementation. 
 
2. Policy Domains Design and Implementation 
2.1. Design Forces and Considerations 
 
Arch, and the subsequent response to Arch in Ward, Xu, Conway et al. are the genesis of 
this idea of state machines employed in a configurable policy domain. The system allows 
curators to apply dynamically applied high-level policies in a manner that allows 
assessment and validation of the preservation environment. This assessment enables audit 
and certification as a trusted environment in the manner of ISO 16363. 
 
Policy-based digital preservation has proven successful in environments such as the 
United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and in national-
scale data-driven research cyberinfrastructure. Policy based data management puts an 
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emphasis on rules and actions that occur close to data sources and are automatically 
applied regardless of access methods. The fact that iRODS focuses on providing 
appropriate policy enforcement points that are triggered regardless of the access 
method while remaining neutral to how each site utilizes these policy enforcement 
points may be the key to its success, and this approach is thus adopted as a central 
design tenet of policy domains.  
 
A key force in the design is the recognition of the diversity of problems that can be 
viewed with a policy-based data perspective. Records Information Management (RIM) 
and archival administration ask key questions that can orient a policy domains approach 
to digital preservation based on purposes that drive digital curation, including 
“determining what the information is, where it came from, how it was used, when it was 
created, who created it, and who benefits from it” (Cohen 2016). Aspects of policy-based 
data management have been identified in industry and academic research. For example, 
Information Lifecycle Management (ILM) has been a topic of research in enterprise data 
systems. ILM is concerned with “assigning a time-dependent value to information to 
facilitate storing the information according to its value, and deleting it at the appropriate 
time” (Al-Fedaghi 2013). It could be argued that ILM and RIM, are actually specific 
instances of policy-based data management, and each is colored by the purpose of the 
respective data collections. 
 
The management of scientific research data has been recognized as a significant 
challenge by the National Science Foundation, as exemplified by the DataNet initiative 
(Moore Rajasekar 2014). There are many parallels between digital preservation 
 21 
environments and research data management systems. This is especially seen in the 
National Science Foundation’s “Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 21st Century Discovery” 
which calls for management of research data so that it is “openly accessible while 
suitably protected, and are reliably preserved” (Bement 2007). The DataNet Federation 
Consortium explicitly linked the stages of the research data lifecycle to data management 
policies at each stage, as illustrated by this figure (DataNet Federation Consortium 2017): 
 
 
Figure 5 from DFC Community-based Collections Lifecycle  
 
 
The common thread through these varied data management approaches is that they can be 
addressed through policy-based data management. A key force on the design of policy 
domains is that it must be flexible enough and complete enough to serve a wide 
range of domains beyond trusted digital preservation. Maintaining a focus on a 
limited set of key abstractions is thus an important consideration. iRODS is 
necessary but not sufficient as a platform for policy-based data management. It is 
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incumbent on implementers to provide the policies and define the relationship of their 
management policies to the events that can trigger them as well as to the metadata that 
represents the result of the application of these policies. Policy domains do not replace 
the current mechanisms of iRODS, they must define the relationships between 
policies and the key properties managed by these policies. 
 
iRODS has evolved into a platform with a multi-faceted plug-in architecture. Rule 
engines, microservices, authentication services, and even the iRODS network protocol 
have been transformed into pluggable components. Policy sets have been offered as a 
way to provide pre-configured sets of policies for particular domains in a way that they 
can be shared among groups. A complexity of policy sets is that they may require a 
number of different components addressing different types of plug-ins along with 
external software tools and frameworks. Pulling together components and capabilities 
of various types and tying them together as a coherent package is thus a key 
requirement of a policy domains system, essentially defining the components of a 
policy set and their packaging and installation. 
 
The focus of policy domains is on the rules and policy enforcement points presented by 
iRODS. Policy enforcement points can be likened to aspects in aspect-oriented 
programming (Kiczales 1997). An aspect is a cross-cutting concern in a program or 
system that is intercepted during the normal course of operation of a system. These 
aspects can centralize the handling of these cross-cutting concerns and apply them as 
procedures are invoked in a system. Aspects generally provide pre- and post-processing 
so that code representing cross-cutting concerns can be applied around invocations of a 
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method or procedure. Examples include data transformation, logging, alteration of 
invocation parameters or results, or application of authorization for actions. In this 
example from the iRODS Rule Language reference, a policy is applied in response to a 
put operation that ingests data into an iRODS grid. The following rule, from the iRODS 
rule language documentation, creates a copy of any new object with a new name as a 
response to a put operation (iRODS 2017). 
acPostProcForPut { 
 on($objPath like "*.txt") { 
   msiDataObjCopy($objPath,"$objPath.copy"); 
 } 
} 
 
These types of policy enforcement points were sufficient to develop and enforce policies 
that could encompass the ISO 16363 standard in Moore’s “Trustworthy policies for 
distributed repositories” (Moore et al. 2017). As in Arch, the policies produced by Moore 
required the maintenance of sophisticated preservation metadata generated by the 
application of these policies in order to support validation and assessment of the effect of 
these policies. and to control and orchestrate the proper application of these policies. In 
order to provide a trusted repository environment that complies with ISO 16363, one can 
apply Moore’s Theory of Digital Preservation and devise assessment criteria that can be 
used to certify trustworthiness. 
 
Policy-managed systems for digital preservation can involve rules, microservices, and 
plugins, as well as other external capabilities and tools utilized by policies. This project 
attempts to bring these various elements together into a cohesive definition that can be 
likened to an installable policy set. Before delving into relationship between these 
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elements it is necessary to discuss state machines and how they help order and regulate 
the various policies and metadata in a domain. 
2.2. State Machines  
 
State machines are an abstraction allowing the encoding of an algorithm or workflow. 
State machines provide structure and rigor to the functioning of a system. A simple 
definition of a state machine is provided by Shead, who observed that “a state machine 
will read a series of inputs. When it reads an input, it will switch to a different state. Each 
state specifies which state to switch for a given input” (Shead 2011). A state machine 
functions as mechanism for transduction of a stream of inputs to a stream of outputs. The 
transduction involves an ordering and constraining of the inputs to a stream of outputs 
(Kaelbling 2011). This transduction function can be utilized to interpret low-level policy 
enforcement points as high-level abstract events to which policy domain capabilities can 
be attached. This transduction function occurs over time. Schneider notes that the outputs 
of a state machine are “completely determined by the sequence of events it processes, 
independent of time and any other activity in a system” (Schneider 2017). Policy domains 
operate on top of finite state machines. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) defines a finite state machine as “a model of computation consisting 
of a set of states, a start state, an input alphabet, and a transition function that maps input 
symbols and current states to a next state. Computation begins in the start state with an 
input string. It changes to new states depending on the transition function” (NIST 2016). 
A state machine provides a framework made of several components, to which we can 
attach certain policy domain components and functions (Kaelbling 2011). These 
components are: 
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• A set of delineated states. These states are described in a particular policy domain 
as a plug-in to the transduction function.  
• A set of inputs. This is termed an input vocabulary by the author. In policy 
domains, this vocabulary consists of the low-level policy enforcement point, 
directly triggered event, or timed event that will be interpreted by the transduction 
function. 
• A set of outputs. This is termed the output vocabulary. The primary manifestation 
is the high-level policy enforcement point that is triggered, along with the context 
that is provided to the triggered high-level policy enforcement point. 
• A next state function. This is the function that “maps the input at time t and the 
state at time t to the output at time t”. This is the function that decides on the 
proper transition to take given the input vocabulary and the current state at t. 
• An output function that will result in an action at the state transition. In policy 
domains that results in the invocation of a high-level policy enforcement point in 
iRODS. 
 
There are two primary types of finite state machines. These are deterministic and 
nondeterministic state machines. Deterministic state machines have only a single 
transition for any input. In the policy domains case, particularly with OAIS mapping, we 
are using nondeterministic finite state machines. Shead defines these as “finite state 
machines where a given input from a particular state can lead to more than one different 
state” (Shead 2011). In our policy domain mappings for OAIS a state transition that 
causes a virus scan to run on ingest could result in either a validated SIP or an invalid 
SIP. This non-determinism is required to handle these sorts of exigencies. 
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State machines provide an enforceable ordering to the flow of a data object in a 
preservation environment. An AIP cannot be ingested into archival storage before it has 
been properly assembled and validated. A SIP cannot be processed before it is checked 
for viruses. The advantage of a state machine was recognized in response to the 
requirements of Arch. What follows is a discussion of how state machines enhance and 
order a preservation environment when we consider the role of state machines in 
maintaining the various forms of knowledge encapsulated in a policy-managed 
preservation environment. 
 
2.3. State Machines and Knowledge Encapsulation in Preservation 
Environments 
 
In Trustworthy Policies for Distributed Repositories, Moore developed an 
implementation of the ISO 16363 standards for audit and certification of trustworthy 
repositories. This implementation consisted of preservation capabilities (microservices), 
policies (rules), and associated preservation metadata and audit logs that could be 
validated via assessment criteria to arrive at a certification of trustworthiness (Moore et 
al. 2017). Moore describes these components in his implementations as forms of 
knowledge, in four classes. We can consider each of these forms of knowledge and how 
the application of policy domain concepts can result in a refactored, rigorous design. 
 
The first form of knowledge in the Moore approach are the static, global variables that 
map locations in an iRODS grid hierarchy where various documents and digital objects 
are to be stored. The policy domain approach uses a similar global configuration 
approach to map portions of an iRODS file hierarchy to represent a purpose or context. 
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The segmentation of a policy domain into specific areas creates what are termed regions. 
This provides a coarse-grained segregation of low-level events into general categories 
and provides boundaries between areas of a policy domain which can be controlled by 
role. This enhances the ability of a policy domain to interpret a low-level storage event in 
a domain, producing an event that can be sent into the state machine to trigger 
appropriate transitions. This device is somewhat analogous to a system of hierarchical 
states, where each region has well defined entry and exit points, encouraging a 
partitioning of data objects and metadata and reducing the information leakage between 
policies responsible for these regions. 
 
The second form of knowledge in Moore are the “dynamic properties that define 
information about each archived record”. This translates to iRODS Attribute-Value-Unit 
(AVU) metadata. The introduction of policy domains has a significant impact on this 
form of knowledge. This project focuses on the dynamic metadata values enumerated in 
Table 2.2 in Trustworthy Policies. These metadata correlate with the ingest and archival 
storage responsibilities in the OAIS Reference Model. Using the notion of policy 
domains as state machines, we can refactor these metadata and express them in the form 
of a state machine. Metadata that can be expressed in the policy domain state machine 
design are called intrinsic metadata. Some of the metadata values defined in 2.2 remain in 
the policy domains arrangement as preservation metadata that may be managed by 
policy. An example of this type of data is the Audit-Depositor value that records the 
principal that deposited the SIP into the archive. The latter case, variables that are 
maintained as state, we can call automatic metadata. We can use this example state 
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machine to refactor several variables from Table 2.2. The distinction between intrinsic 
and automatic metadata is worthy of a more detailed exploration. 
 
As an example of intrinsic metadata, we can consider the various flags that denote 
required checks. Examples include Archive-CheckIntegrity, Archive-CheckMetadata, 
and Archive-CheckProtected. These flags represent knowledge about the policies active 
in a preservation environment. Refactoring these flags into state transitions and 
accompanying actions provides an encapsulation of the same knowledge. Each of these 
actions, checking integrity of an archive, checking for required metadata, and checking 
for protected data, can be depicted as actions fired by state transitions. The actions that 
occur at these state transitions, as we will see, result in the invocation of high-level policy 
enforcement points that can either invoke preservation capabilities appropriate to that 
repository, or can simply provide a noop pass-through to the next state.  
 
This intrinsic metadata is distinct from automatic metadata. Automatic metadata are state 
variables that are captured during the processing of high-level policy enforcement points, 
reflecting descriptive information that represents the instances of a state machine (that is, 
an individual SIP, AIP, or DIP). Examples of this from Table 2.2 include Audit-handle, 
representing the unique identifier assigned to a preservation object. Another example 
would be Archive-IPR, representing the intellectual property rights owner. These are 
metadata that can be enforced and elicited by calls to high-level policy enforcement 
points, and the provisioning of these metadata can be validated and enforced through the 
action of the policy domain. 
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The third form of knowledge are the policies themselves. These policies are intimately 
connected to the dynamic preservation metadata they maintain. In addition to providing a 
translation of these intrinsic metadata, the policy domain makes explicit the relationship 
of intrinsic metadata to the services that maintain these metadata. A policy domain 
maintains this intrinsic metadata via a well-defined pipeline, introducing ordering and 
prerequisites. A policy domain, by specifying the inputs and outputs at each policy 
enforcement point, encapsulates information about the knowledge required at each point. 
This encoding of the meaning of intrinsic metadata describing the archival workflow is a 
novel feature of policy domains.  
 
This ordering function can be illustrated by considering key prerequisite tasks in a 
preservation environment, such as asking whether a deposit is from an appropriate 
source, whether it contains a virus, or whether it contains sensitive information, such as 
Social Security or credit card numbers. One could encode requirements to validate each 
of these checks using the intrinsic metadata of Table 2.2, however, nothing in Table 2.2 
captures the consideration that these checks should precede steps such as replication or 
movement to other parts of the archival workflow. Intrinsic metadata also captures the 
prerequisites for each state transition and high-level action, allowing optimizations such 
as parallelization of workflows with appropriate fork and join points. The sum of the state 
machine design, the current state of a SIP or AIP in the preservation workflow, and an 
inventory of the specific policies encoded at each policy enforcement point faithfully 
capture knowledge that can be understood and interrogated via assessment criteria. 
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The fourth form of knowledge described by Moore are policy functions. Which are small 
units that can be described as utilities or focused capabilities that can be utilized by 
various policies. These small capabilities can be reimagined in policy domains as 
representing additional packages, functions, and libraries. While not in the scope of this 
project, it is certainly possible to take the further step of encapsulating preservation 
capabilities in the form of virtual machines or containers, and deploying these capabilities 
as part of the policy domain, easing installation and operational concerns, while allowing 
the possibility to preserve these capabilities in the environment itself. Given this 
complete capture of scope, and a preservation of the original arrangement of the 
deposited SIP, it could also be possible to replay an archival workflow as a validation 
step, or even as an error correction capability.  
 
This discussion of knowledge can be illustrated by exploring the intrinsic and automatic 
metadata embodied in this segment of an ingest process.  
 
 
Figure 6. Sample ingest sub-state UML representation 
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This example demonstrates a scenario suggested by portions of the Table 2.2 for ingest. 
The overall flow, from right to left, depicts the deposit of material to the landing zone in 
the Ingest area of OAIS. What we see is an initial state where an event, such as an 
upload, causing a transition SIPPostSIPDeposit. This transition will fire an action in the 
state machine that are surfaced as a high-level policy enforcement point carrying with it 
the context data associated with this event. This hook would allow a curator to encode 
their own pre-checks or external actions that result in a transition to the 
SIPPreDepositInStagingArea state. This state occurs in a region of the policy domain 
where the low-level action of a put of a file can be easily interpreted. This first transition 
is triggered by an external event, originating as an iRODS policy enforcement point, and 
utilizing the region construct to recognize the intent.  
 
Once the SIPPreDepositInStagingArea state is reached, an internal transition can be fired 
that begins processing in a sub-state machine with the overall purpose of completing an 
initial validation of the SIP before it can move to the AIP assembly area. Note that 
through the firing of internal events, the high-level policy enforcement point 
SIPScanForVirus is invoked. This can be a noop pass-through, or it can include the 
invocation of appropriate virus scanning software as encapsulated in the aforementioned 
policy function corresponding to this particular tool or workflow. The knowledge of this 
particular action is captured in the policies in the environment, and the result of this 
action results in a valid or invalid state. All of these represent intrinsic metadata mediated 
by the policy domain system. 
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These patterns of event -> transition -> action -> state repeat over and over again, 
involving multiple layers of cooperating components. It is important to note that unless a 
valid result is returned from the virus scan action, it will be impossible to advance to later 
states in the SIP validation, such as replication or checks for sensitive information. It is to 
this system of cooperating components that we now turn our attention. 
 
3. Policy Domain Implementation 
 
Building on the capabilities of iRODS, and recognizing the various forms of knowledge 
embodied in a digital preservation environment, a state machine mediated policy domain 
representing these forms of knowledge is demonstrated. This policy domain prototype 
consisted of several software components that define a packaged policy set representing 
an arbitrary vertical application. The elements of this prototype illustrate a solution upon 
which systems like Arch can be built. This system maintains the spirit of iRODS as a user 
configurable policy framework.  
 
The iRODS data grid is at the heart of the policy domains system. Our focus here is on 
the role of the rule engine in enforcing policy through the notion of policy enforcement 
points that can trigger computer actionable rules to control the function of the 
preservation environment, and to maintain system and preservation metadata as a result 
of these actions. 
 
iRODS acts as the ultimate store for data objects and preservation metadata. iRODS 
provides a stream of events caused by user action, by periodic events, or from chains of 
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actions that are triggered by state transitions and internal events. iRODS sends these 
events to registered listeners. These listeners manage data coming from parts of the 
policy domain in iRODS and transform them into events understood by a state machine 
that manages the lifecycle of data objects in the domain. Ultimately, the goal is to utilize 
the guidance of the state machine to define high-level events and respond by firing 
actions corresponding to the appropriate state transition as a new high-level policy 
enforcement point.  In order of review, the primary components of a policy domain are: 
• The iRODS Python rule engine, linked to policy enforcement points. 
• An iRODS hierarchy divided into regions, along with associated roles and global 
metadata values. 
• A link from the rule engine to an AMQP asynchronous queue. 
• A message bus subscribed to region events to translate low-level policy 
enforcement points into state machine events. 
• A state machine associated with a policy domain that maintains state for a 
managed object and enumerates the states, transitions, and triggering events.  
• Actions associated with state transitions that trigger the iRODS rule engine, 
causing the firing of high-level translated policy enforcement points associated 
with a domain. 
• Associated tools, workflows, and capabilities that provide services to high-level 
policy enforcement point implementations. 
• A mechanism to structure and initialize a policy domain, and all of these 
associated components, as a complete policy set. 
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• Automated validation of assessment criteria to certify the proper handling of data 
objects in a domain. 
 
These components provide a structure that can capture the various types of knowledge 
required to fulfil the goal of a trustworthy preservation environment. In developing this 
prototype, some thought has been given to extracting common framework code from 
domain specific components. It is proposed that development of supporting framework 
code and standardized installation procedures can lead to more precise and repeatable 
definitions of policy sets.  
3.1. Software Components of a Prototype Policy Domain System 
3.1.1. Python Rule Engine 
 
iRODS by default comes with a core set of policy enforcement points. These rules are 
placed in an /etc/irods directory on the storage resource and consist of policies that will 
fire based on actions within the storage resource, such as placing or deleting a file, 
annotating with metadata, or accessing a file. This portion of a policy domain is fairly 
generic and can be thought of as a general framework across domains. The key capability 
here is to extract the state information in the scope of the policy enforcement point to 
produce a data structure, and then to pass this event on as a message posted to an AMQP 
exchange or topic. As part of this message creation process, this prototype introduces a 
component that can scan and recognize paths where actions occur. For the purposes of 
this pilot, the classification of paths as regions where activities occur is sufficient to 
recognize the appropriate topic mapping, as in this example: 
 
def classify_path(self, path): 
  self.logger.info("classify_path() for: %s" % path) 
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  if path.startswith("/zone1/home/ingest/landing_zone"): 
      self.logger.info("landing_zone") 
      return "landing_zone" 
 
  if path.startswith("/zone1/home/ingest/sip_validated"): 
      self.logger.info("sip_validated") 
      return "sip_validated" 
 
  if path.startswith("/zone1/home/ingest/aip_assembly"): 
      self.logger.info("aip_assembly") 
      return "aip_assembly" 
 
  if path.startswith("/zone1/home/ingest/aip_pickup_window"): 
      self.logger.info("aip_assembly") 
      return "aip_pickup_window" 
 
  raise LookupError("Cannot resolve path %s" % path) 
 
Figure 7. from ingest_policy_domain_py 
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3.1.1. Region Processing with AMQP 
 
Note that the return value of the path evaluation processing is a string representing the 
assigned domain. More sophisticated policy domains can go beyond region to interrogate 
current state, state history, and other metadata to make this determination.  This region is 
appended to the globally named policy domain to derive an exchange name. For this 
example, the global domain is “ingest”. A deposit of a SIP into the landing zone will 
arrive in a path defined by a region, and will result in the publication of a postProcForPut 
message to the AMQP topic “ingest:landing_zone”. 
 
This region to exchange mapping is a critical aspect of policy domain. The separation of 
concerns begins with the segregation of these regions into focused services responsible 
for routing traffic in each region to the appropriate listener in the state machine tier. For 
our example ingest domain, the following screenshot highlights the regions involved in 
the SIP ingest processing portion of a repository as reflected in AMQP queues that can be 
routed from the topic queue for the ingest policy domain: 
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Figure 8. AMQP queues bound to the ingest exhange 
 
The policy enforcement point thus processes low-level events arising from a region, 
classifies them in a domainname:region scheme, and transmits these events to the core 
policy domain service. 
 
3.1.2. Message Bus and Event Translation 
 
Attached to the receiving end of the routed AMQP queues is a message bus arrangement. 
Enterprise Integration Patterns describes a message bus as “a combination of a common 
data model, a common command set, and a messaging infrastructure to allow different 
systems to communicate through a shared set of interfaces. This is analogous to a 
communications bus in a computer system” (Holpe). The key motivation for the 
introduction of a message bus was to adopt a framework that could handle a variety of 
asynchronous messages, supported sophisticated routing and message shaping pipelines, 
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and that provided a basis for a plug-in extensible model adaptable to specific policy 
domain implementations. This pilot adopts the Spring Integration framework, which is an 
enterprise-class open source platform that supports a dependency injection form of 
programming. Spring Integration is especially suitable for developing a pluggable 
framework as it is able to scan supplied extension libraries and discover and wire together 
domain specific components. These domain specific components can be registered per 
region to handle messages appropriately while having common domain services injected 
by Spring.  
 
The region construct’s differential routing of policy enforcement point information is one 
component of the critical low-level to high-level mapping process that is the central 
function of a policy domain. This mapping process actually has several sources of 
information to draw from, including region data, data about the current and permitted 
states, and the state of any properties that guide the operation of a domain. Ultimately, it 
is the listener component receiving the regional events from the message queue that 
determines the proper event to send to the state machine from several sources. 
 
First, there are the policy enforcement points themselves as well as the contextual data 
supplied by the rule engine as session state variables, or rei data structures. This supplies 
information to identify the region, the user’s role information, and the identity of the data 
objects and collections involve. Second is the existing state of the target data object in the 
state machine. This history can be interrogated to arrive at a constrained set of anticipated 
events. Reducing this universe of possible choices though expression of a domain as a 
state machine is thus an aid in both processing events and in understanding incoming 
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action. At this point, events can be rejected in the message bus layer as violating the 
expected operations. For example, manually moving a SIP that has not complete the 
entire pre-validation pipeline would trigger the deposit of a SIP in the AIP assembly 
region. While iRODS will faithfully report this region event as a proper policy 
enforcement point, the state machine for the object does not show this deposit of a 
validated SIP as an expected event. Depending on the details of the policy domain 
implementation, this could be rejected in the message bus layer as an unsupported 
operation, or a guard condition in the state machine could recognize that this is not a 
valid state transition. This prototype suggests that the message handler should make the 
direct interpretation of the proper event, and if that event is seen as a possible candidate, 
it should be passed on to the state machine, which can make the actual decision as to 
whether the transition should fire.  
 
Upon receipt of this event, it is up to the state machine to make the final determination on 
the correctness of the next indicated event and to call the next appropriate high-level 
policy enforcement point or internal event. The distribution of responsibility between the 
event interpreter and the state machine conditional evaluation of events is an interesting 
design tension. There is not a clear separation, and domains may emphasize the roles in 
different ways. It is important to consider the various sources of information that the 
cooperating components can use to properly interpret events at the time a message arrives 
on the message bus. It is also important to consider how various error states and invalid 
states are modeled, and where and when such error events should be surfaced in a high-
level policy enforcement point. 
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Refining this division of responsibility is one of the critical design points that needs to be 
resolved before a full implementation would be possible. 
 
3.1.3. State Machine Implementation 
 
The state machine component of a policy domain is the final link in the message bus tier. 
As noted, regional events appear on a topic queue, and the message bus listener interprets 
the contextual data and current state to arrive at the possible valid events. The event is a 
construct understood by the state machine and configured in the state machine 
initialization code. The event is a trigger to go from one state to another via a state 
transition. The state transition is associated with an action that is largely a gathering of 
appropriate contextual data and the subsequent calling of appropriate processes or high-
level policy enforcement points that carry out the appropriate activities at that state 
transition. In this prototype, Spring State Machine is used. These state machines can be 
persistent, and distributed across multiple platforms, matching the distributed nature of 
the iRODS platform. Spring State Machine provides a full implementation of state 
machine functions, including hierarchical states, complex state flows, parallel processing 
with forks and joins, as well as a rich model for transitions, guards, events, and actions. 
 
The configuration of a state machine in Spring can be accomplished through several 
mechanisms. A domain-specific language allows a state machine to be configured in 
code. State machines can also be produced from a serialized form and interpreted 
programmatically to produce the fully configured state machine. Ultimately, state 
machines could be described by JSON files stored in the iRODS grid as preservation 
metadata. Given the focus on policy domains as knowledge encapsulation in a 
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preservation environment, this definition within the preservation environment has some 
interesting possibilities. For the purposes of this demo, the straight-forward programmatic 
route was chosen. In configuring Spring beans that represent the domain, Spring State 
Machine can inject a StateMachineFactory implementation that can dynamically build the 
policy domain state machine configuration. The higher level generic framework can 
bootstrap supporting components and expect the factory and resulting state machine to be 
provided by specific domain implementations.  
 
States are described, along with the transitions that link states. These transitions are fired 
from events. To this point, the focus has been on events derived through the interpretation 
of low-level policy enforcement points in iRODS. While this is a key event source, it is 
not the only way that events can be presented to the state machine. Some events can be 
explicitly fired from high-level policy enforcement points. For example, a high-level 
policy enforcement point may invoke a virus scan process on a file. The outcome of that 
scan could directly send an event that causes a state transition to the next valid state. A 
policy domain implementation ultimately could include a set of utility rules that represent 
calls to acknowledge the completion of an action, and that should trigger the next event. 
It is possible to handle these high-level generated events in several ways. Such events can 
result in the deposit of a new event in the message queue, signaling processing on the 
message bus layer. This fits well with the signal-to-state-machine-event cycle. Such 
signals can be created by calling rules and microservices provided in the policy domain 
package as part of the iRODS rule base. The standard noop mode in a high-level policy 
enforcement point can simply pass on the action and fall through to a call to trigger the 
next appropriate event. Other events can originate from the firing of a periodic rule. This 
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type of event is especially relevant in the archival storage functions of OAIS to carry out 
fixity checks and format migrations. 
 
3.1.4. High-Level Policy Enforcement Point Callbacks 
 
Actions are the final link in the chain of policy domains. Actions gather appropriate 
contextual information associated with the state transition and ultimately call back 
iRODS using the rsExecMyRule function. The rule that is fired is the high-level policy 
enforcement point in iRODS. This high-level policy enforcement point is the surface of 
the policy domain and that ultimate point of configuration by the programmer or 
administrator responsible for tailoring policies appropriate to their site.  
3.1.5. Policy Functions 
 
In “Trustworthy Policies for Distributed Repositories”, Moore describes policy functions. 
In that context, policy functions were common functions shared by multiple policies, 
extracted out into utilities. These policy functions are explicitly enumerated as a type of 
knowledge embodied in a system, and this capture of knowledge can continue to expand 
as new containerization methods come into use. Docker and related containerization 
technologies have already shown great promise as a means to preserve and provide 
reproducibility in scientific research (Hung et al. 2016). Docker images can even be 
exported as a binary data stream and maintained in the preservation environment. By 
explicitly integrating tools and capabilities appropriate to a particular policy domain as 
containers, it becomes possible to completely capture and define the preservation 
environment. This has two very practical benefits. First, it eases installation and 
configuration of a policy domain by provisioning dependencies of a default policy set. 
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Second, it allows the preservation environment to be self-describing to a maximum 
extent, even to the point of preserving versions of a preservation workflow such that 
operations can be replayed or reproduced. 
 
Policy domains are partially motivated by the notion of policy sets. Policy driven 
mechanisms of iRODS provide a substrate for different vertical implementations. 
Packages of policies and capabilities could be created and shared to let iRODS take on 
various roles. Policy domains encompass global configuration, policy enforcement 
points, policies, metadata and capabilities in a rigorous fashion. Technologies such as 
Ansible could be used to orchestrate the provisioning and administration of a policy 
domain on a given zone. In this prototype, the artifacts are installed by manual 
configuration, including the configuration of the rule sets, installation of the message 
queues, and the startup of the externally attached message bus and state machine. These 
tasks are suitable for automation. In addition, the policy domain python libraries do 
include an init() step that provisions the exchanges and queues associated with a policy 
domain. Going forward, it is proposed that a new iCommand could be created, leveraging 
the notion of an archetype as implemented in the Maven build framework. An 
iinitdomain iCommand is proposed that could take a policy domain as an archetype, such 
that 
 
iinitdomain oais-ingest  
 
would provision the policy sets, install the containerized capabilities, and wire together 
message queues and message bus components into a functioning unit. This approach is 
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especially interesting in that the focus of a policy domain is primarily not on defining a 
complete solution in a one-size-fits-all fashion. A policy domain is designed as a 
scaffolding, in the form of high-level policy enforcement points, that allows an individual 
repository to tailor their operations in specific areas while accepting sensible defaults in 
other areas. 
 
The following diagram describes the overall design and flow of an event from an external 
stimulus (such as the firing of a policy enforcement point in iRODS) through the firing of 
a high-level policy enforcement point in the policy domain. 
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Figure 9. Policy domain system flow 
 
1. External stimulus causes a low-level policy enforcement point (PEP) to fire 
2. PEP formats region message and expected values and publishes to a regional topic 
3. Region queue bound to topic activates the policy domain message bus. Message 
transform function will consult region, metadata, and current state to produce an 
event in the state machine 
4. State machine transition is triggered by the event, firing an action 
5. Action activates an iRODS rule, providing a contract for the inputs and outputs as 
well as a site-configurable implementation of the required policy function, 
producing output data to gauge the success of the action 
6. The high-level PEP updates automatic metadata in the state machine history as 
well as any indicated metadata derived from the action or high-level PEP action 
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4. Evaluation  
At its heart, this project is a refactoring of the policy enforcement architecture of the 
iRODS data grid. Policy domains are a mechanism to establish explicit relationships 
between policy enforcement points in terms of ordering and the nature of the automatic 
metadata produced by the system. This prototype has gone through several architectural 
changes as the capabilities and limitations inherent in the current rule engine architecture 
became apparent.  
 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations in terms of the scope of the prototype and 
the allotted time. The essential characteristics of a policy domain implementation are 
present in this system. Recall that the original Arch system revealed that the key missing 
link for a system that could dynamically bind high-level policies to iRODS was a layer 
that could interpret low-level policy enforcement points into high level, semantically 
significant events. In this the prototype succeeded. The division of responsibilities 
between the global configuration and region setup, the iRODS PEP (Policy Enforcement 
Point) to event translation, the state machine transition and accompanying action as the 
trigger for a high-level PEP, and the intrinsic state metadata kept by state machine 
persistence mechanisms present a fairly well isolated architecture with a minimum of 
mutual knowledge. Using these basic tools, it seems rather clear that many types of 
functioning domains can be fashioned. 
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This being said, there are several areas where the prototype is incomplete. This work can 
thus inform follow-on efforts around policy domains, as well as general architecture 
developments for the iRODS grid. 
 
One of the biggest issues encountered during the development of this prototype was the 
mismatch between the presentation of the current PEPs in iRODS and the eventual form 
the high-level PEPs had to take. The original intent of the project was to provide .re or 
.py files that could be implemented in the /etc/irods rule-base, so that domain 
configuration could be centralized, and so that it would be familiar to the iRODS 
community. For example, this snippet of a default core.re shows a range of PEPs and 
associated policies, including default noop actions:  
 
acCreateUser { 
  acPreProcForCreateUser; 
  acCreateUserF1; 
  acPostProcForCreateUser; } 
acCreateUserF1 { 
 ON($otherUserName == "anonymous") { 
  msiCreateUser  :::  msiRollback; 
  msiCommit;  }  } 
acCreateUserF1 { 
  msiCreateUser  :::  msiRollback; 
  acCreateDefaultCollections  :::  msiRollback; 
  msiAddUserToGroup("public")  :::  msiRollback; 
  msiCommit;  } 
 
Figure 9. iRODS Policy Enforcement Points 
 
It was initially proposed that the high-level PEPs associated with a domain would be 
similarly arranged. It became clear in development that this design would not work, given 
that the PEP in a policy domain is not the focus of control, rather it is a callback in the 
execution of an action in a state transition controlled from outside of iRODS.  
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In this design, the individual PEPs are presented as stand-alone rule files which may be 
stored in iRODS, and which can be initially provisioned in the initialization of the policy 
domain. The rules are then called by actions triggered by state transitions, and can report 
back the success or failure, as well as provide a specification for the expected return 
values. This arrangement provides an amount of familiarity to the iRODS community 
while allowing the state machine action to throw any exceptions or errors at the 
appropriate point in the state transition. This shift of the locus of control out to the state 
machine thus challenges some aspects of traditional iRODS PEPs.  
 
The mismatch between the form of low-level policy enforcement points as they exist in 
iRODS and the high-level policy enforcement points that specify input as well as output 
data as a contract was initially seen as a design problem. After analysis, the binding of 
input and output parameters to a policy enforcement point emerges as a key design 
improvement of policy domains. Returning to Appendix I and observing the policies 
around protected data, the policy domain approach provides several enhancements. First, 
the prerequisites and ordering of protected data scanning policies are now strictly 
ordered. This can have a practical effect of limiting copying or replication of data until 
after all protected data has been identified and handled property. Second, curators can use 
the offered high-level policy enforcement point as a plug-in point with a clear purpose, 
and with clearly defined input and output parameters, giving them the luxury of focusing 
on a semantically meaningful operation with reduced requirements to delve into metadata 
or low-level interpretation to arrive at the correct point to invoke a protected data search. 
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Third, the strict contracts in the high-level policy enforcement points guide the 
implementing curator to properly convey the required automatic metadata values if the 
site opts to do protected data scanning, while a noop at this state transition can by default 
record that no protected data scanning was done. 
 
Appendix II is a state machine UML diagram of a policy domain refactoring of the ingest 
portions of Appendix I. Table 2.2 has been augmented with explicit classifications of 
properties as implicit and automatic metadata. For example, these items regarding virus 
scanning from Table 2.2:  
 
SIP 
Archive-
CheckViru
s 
Flag for 
whether to 
check for 
virus 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Can be set by high-
level PEP 
checkForVirus 
SIP 
Audit-
CheckViru
s 
Status flag 
set to “1” if 
a virus is 
detected in 
a SIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
High level PEP 
checkForVirus can 
result in setting an 
invalid SIP contains 
virus and halt SIP 
processing 
 
Have been converted into implicit (Archive-CheckVirus) metadata and automatic (Audit-
CheckVirus) metadata. Using a state transition and associated action that can call an 
iRODS policy domain rule with an explicit contract for output variables, we can see how 
a preset default with no virus scan manages these properties: 
archiveCheckVirus { 
 #Input parameters are: 
 #  sipCollectionPath 
 #   
 #Output parameter is: 
 # virusScanStatus: 0=good scan, -1=no scan, 1=virus detected 
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 # virusScanAgent: None | ClamAV | Norton 
 # virusDetectionDetails: message regarding virus detected 
 
  writeLine("stdout","archiveCheckVirusFor  *collectionPath"); 
   
  # insert virus scan capability here 
   
  # noop return values are default 
   
  *virusScanAgent = "None"; 
  *virusDetectionDetails = ""; 
  *virusScanStatus = "-1"; 
   
   
} 
INPUT *collectionPath="/path" 
OUTPUT ruleExecOut,*virusScanStatus,*virusScanAgent,*virusDetectionDetails 
 
In initializing a policy domain, the system could have various policy enforcement points 
with noop defaults, passing appropriate responses back to record as automatic metadata, 
or they could have default error processing if the site has not configured a policy 
properly. In other circumstances, a default policy could invoke a capability that is also 
installed during policy domain initialization, such as a Docker version of ClamAV. 
Again, it is worth stressing that this arrangement controls the order of policies, the 
possible states and transitions from any point in a curation workflow, as well as the 
global variables that are automatically recorded at each point. 
 
Much thought went into the design of the iRODS rule engine in terms of minimizing 
side-effects caused by the operation of policies. Even so, as Helmer (2011) points out, 
microservices running outside of the direct control of the iRODS rollback mechanism can 
produce side-effects that cannot be accounted for. The introduction of the state machine 
mechanism does much to constrain and order the behavior of the system, however, there 
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are two areas in particular where the prototype does not fully address side effects. First, 
there is the dependency on the proper encoding of the high-level policy enforcement 
points and the included user actions at these PEPs. The rule being called from the state 
transition can only trust that the PEP is properly handled, and that any side effects are 
properly accounted for. Second, the asynchronous arrangement and the delegation of 
control from the rule engine to an external media serves to increase the surface area of the 
system vulnerable to side-effects. Failures, misrouting of events and messages, and errors 
in event interpretation are areas for future concern. 
 
A very interesting area that is only proposed in this prototype is the form and 
effectiveness of assessment criteria that can validate the described intrinsic and automatic 
metadata in certifying trustworthiness in an automated fashion. The prototype describes a 
mechanism, but a demonstration of automated assessment and certification is left as a 
follow up. The methods to access and interpret policy domain intrinsic metadata in an 
assessment would be an interesting follow up activity. 
 
The issue of versioning of policies and pathways in the preservation workflow for human 
intervention, problem correction, and resumption of processing are all areas that are left 
unaddressed in this prototype. Additional migration workflows to move SIP, AIP, and 
DIP packages to new formats as well-defined pathways are a proposed solution. The 
ability to assign a version to an archival or other type of data package would allow events 
to be routed to alternative running instances of a policy domain within a same region 
during a migration period. In a preservation environment where the original submission 
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data are preserved in the archival storage area, it is also possible to replay the function of 
a policy domain, either as a validation, or as a method of transformation. 
 
In truth, much of the development of this prototype included basic infrastructure needed 
to form the proper messages and to integrate rules, especially the new Python rule engine, 
into the system. Going forward, the impedance mismatch between the current function of 
an iRODS policy enforcement point and a policy enforcement point that might be under 
the control of, and might require a return of values and status to a policy domain driver is 
an important question. Developing approaches that more closely tie iRODS policies to 
wider infrastructure while limited and managing side effects may be one of the 
development challenges going forward. Policy domains may, in fact, point towards a 
more expansive role for the policy-based data management capabilities of iRODS. 
5. Discussion 
 
Policy domains are offered as a framework for defining and implementing policy sets. 
These policy sets define the management policies, metadata, and capabilities that are 
applied to an iRODS grid in order to carry out a specified function. A function may be 
carried out by defining several cooperating policy domains that work as a system. Policy 
domains act as a layer between the low-level policy enforcement points and events that 
characterize a general data management system and the high-level policy enforcement 
points that define a specific vertical application of a data management system. Examples 
of these defined vertical applications include sensor data sinks, laboratory instrument 
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ingest pipelines, digital media processing platforms, and, for this specific project, trusted 
digital preservation platforms. 
 
Policy domains as a concept arose from prior work on systems supporting dynamic 
binding of high-level policies for digital preservation systems via the Arch prototype. 
Arch led to the identification of a particular problem, which is the translation and 
interpretation of the low-level policy enforcement points native to iRODS to higher level 
events in an archive. That is, is this postProcForPut hook indicating the deposit of a SIP, 
or the creation of an AIP after the completion of an AIP assembly and validation 
pipeline? In order to accomplish this task with a level of rigor, Ward, Hao, and Conway 
proposed the utilization of a state machine mechanism that defined high-level policy 
enforcement points mapped onto actions resulting from state transitions in these state 
machines. This mapping of events onto state machines provides a structure to the 
metadata used to describe the disposition of data objects into the system, limits operations 
to only appropriate sequences of events, and provides a basis for automated evaluation of 
the validity, authenticity, and provenance of a system, guaranteeing that stated policies 
are being correctly implemented. 
 
Much of the work here on policy domains has been informed by Moore’s “Trustworthy 
Policies for Distributed Repositories”. This work defined in great detail the configuration, 
state metadata, and policies that could automate a verifiably trustworthy repository 
according to ISO 16363 standards. This work focused on the forms of knowledge that are 
embedded in a digital preservation system. These forms include the global configuration, 
the policies, the state metadata, and the capabilities of a preservation system. This project 
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provides a concrete implementation of the first three forms of knowledge and points 
towards techniques for encompassing the fourth in a manner that allows provisioning and 
preservation of containerized tools and capabilities. 
 
This policy domains approach installs a structure of regions on an iRODS zone. These 
regions create isolated areas that produce low-level policy enforcement point events. 
These events are organized and broadcast on asynchronous message exchanges, 
organized by the region and type of event. A message bus receives these regionally 
segregated events and can act as a further interpretation layer to produce an event to be 
sent to a state machine. This event producing layer can avail itself of the originating event 
in a region and its context in the form of the session state information in iRODS. The 
event producing layer can consult the history and current state of the appropriate state 
machine in order to arrive at the correct event translation. This event is then sent to the 
state machine in order to determine the next response. Ultimately, it is the high-level 
policy enforcement points that define a policy domain. 
 
Returning to the OAIS Reference Model, it is now useful to review how policy domains 
can be used to fully implement a preservation environment that absorbs and orders the 
policies, state metadata and configuration offered by Moore through the eyes of a data 
curator responsible for standing up and configuring a preservation environment at a 
location.  
 
As illustrated by Figure 1, a preservation environment is composed of cooperating 
components representing an overall data flow of ingest -> archival storage -> 
dissemination. Around this central flow are components that help manage the data 
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through application of security and preservation policies. Given the complexity of OAIS, 
it is proposed that these various components should be a composition of iRODS zones, 
with each zone dedicated to a particular overall function. Focusing on the SIP, AIP, and 
DIP handling in ingest, archival storage, and dissemination, this represents three iRODS 
zones. As data flows through this process, the policy domain arrangement can limit the 
entry and exit points through an explicit model of landing areas and pickup windows. A 
SIP can be deposited by a curator in an isolated area, triggering a pre-validation flow that 
admits this submission into a process that validates and formats an AIP. This AIP can be 
placed into a pickup window for a handoff to the archival domain, and so forth. This has 
the benefit of increasing the separation of concerns, and can increase security, even to the 
point of providing a human-in-the-loop air gap between these domains. This domain-to-
zone mapping also reduces complexity that can result from the intermingling of code 
between domains in rule bases and microservices. 
 
The curator in this example will install three iRODS zones with base functionality and 
then federate these zones. Once this is accomplished, the curator can go to each zone and 
issue the proposed iinitdomain iCommand. This command would take an archetype on 
each zone, perhaps iinitdomain oais-sip, iinitdomain oais-aip, iinitdomain oais-dip. As 
with the base iRODS installation, this could cause a presentation of a data gathering 
interaction to establish the location of other components as well as other information akin 
to the global configuration variables presented in table 2.1 of “Trustworthy Policies for 
Distributed Repositories”. In this case, a group of policy domains must mutually agree on 
entry and exit points.  
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The iinitdomain function would carry out these actions: 
1. Create folder hierarchies that divide each zone into regions, representing internal 
flows with their own entry and exit points. 
2. Install and configure domain specific rule bases that tap into low level policy 
enforcement points in each region. 
3. Create appropriate roles and access controls for each region. 
4. Initialize AMQP exchanges and topic to queue mappings. 
5. Install appropriate commands, microservices, and plugins, and Docker 
components, perhaps using a tool like Ansible. 
6. Install mid-tier listener and state machine components. 
7. Install high-level policy enforcement points with appropriate default actions and 
references to default tools and capabilities. 
 
At this point, the curator now has an operational OAIS repository. The key interface for 
curators becomes this default set of high-level policy enforcement points.  
 
If we focus on the first component, the ingest area, the default rule base could include a 
high-level policy enforcement point when a SIP is deposited. This default behavior may 
include a call to a pre-configured Docker image running an anti-virus tool such as 
ClamScanAV. This default would make the call, evaluate the response, and then 
optionally trigger the next event, which is that the SIP has been virus checked. 
Alternatively, the policy enforcement point may trigger the next event, which is that the 
SIP failed and is moved into a quarantined state in a subsequent state transition. In this 
way, the mechanisms that produce these policy enforcement points can remain opaque to 
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the curator, the archive can exhibit sensible default behavior, yet the curator could elect 
to use a different virus checking tool and configure this with relative ease by 
manipulating the rule base. Note that each archive may have different requirements, thus 
many high-level policy enforcement points may simply take a noop and pass back events 
to proceed through the data flow. Our curator may not be dealing with potentially 
sensitive information, and have no cause to run data detection for Social Security or 
credit card numbers. The policy domains thus provide comprehensive configurability 
where needed and low barriers to entry where every element is not mandatory.  
 
SIPs proceed through regions in each policy domain, conceptually this matches 
hierarchical states in a state machine. Ingest may move from initial validation of a SIP to 
construction of a fully documented AIP by passing through multiple regions. The end of 
the SIP processing would result in a fully packaged AIP deposited into a region on the 
ingest domain serving as a pickup window. This arrival is a terminal state on ingest. The 
AIP process may include a periodic scan of the pickup window, or, as mentioned, AIPs 
could even be physically carried across an air gap as a deposit into the AIP initial region, 
starting the process again.  
 
This process can be repeated through multiple regions, each with well-defined entry and 
exit points, and across multiple domains. As data is maintained in the archival storage 
domain, periodic rules can evaluate the state of archives to guard against data loss. As 
user actions access archival information, they can cause actions that produce 
dissemination packages in the DIP store. These actions are evaluated at all times through 
the policy domain mechanisms, creating a state history and other preservation metadata.  
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A critical function of policy domains is the preservation of knowledge. Trustworthiness 
requires the ability to audit and verify the operation of a preservation environment. This 
project is motivated by the notion that the rigor of state machines and the potential to 
preserve not only the policies and metadata, but also the explicit relationship between 
these policies and resulting preservation metadata can provide greatly enhanced ability to 
automate the certification of a repository as existing in a correct and trustworthy 
condition. It is this ease of configuration resting on top of knowledge encapsulation and 
rigor in organizing preservation metadata for assessment that is the central goal of policy 
domains. Policy domains do not replace the current iRODS policy-managed data 
approach or alter the central function of the iRODS rule engine and the notion of 
configurable policy enforcement points. Policy domains do refactor common patterns of 
rules and metadata markers addressed by conditional branching. Harmonizing policy 
domains with existing successful practices is an important undertaking. This does not 
replace previous work on trusted preservation environments, rather it opens the door to 
refactoring and installation support that can make such a system available to a wider 
audience.  
 
Recall that the initial motivation for policy domains was due to work on dynamic policy 
resolution and binding via the Arch project. This project proposes that policy domains are 
a novel and comprehensive approach to the original challenge, that is, creating a system 
to interpret low-level policy enforcement points and reflect them as semantically rich 
high-level policy enforcement points to which high-level management policies can be 
bound. In developing a solution for this narrowly defined design problem, policy domains 
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also provide interesting new areas of research and development towards better systems 
for managing data and certifying their integrity and security
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7. Appendix I – Refactored Table 2.2 from Trustworthy 
Policies for Digital Repositories 
 
Phase Attribute Meaning Form Policy Domain Refactoring 
AIP Archive-
AIPTemplate 
Name of 
the template 
defining the 
preservatio
n 
information 
for a record 
automatic 
metadata 
Created by high-level PEP policy 
definePreservationMetadataTempl
ate 
AIP Archive-
Report 
Time period 
between 
updates for 
archives 
reports 
global 
configuratio
n 
 
AIP Archive-
CheckHandle 
Process 
Flag set to 
“1” if a 
handle is 
created for 
an AIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Handle creation is a high-level 
PEP captured as intrinsic 
metadata. A contract value for the 
output parameters of this PIP can 
indicate whether a handle is 
created or not required, allowing 
the high-level PEP to feed back 
into automatic metadata. 
AIP Archive-
Replication 
Required 
number of 
replicas for 
an AIP 
global 
configuratio
n 
Created by high-level PEP 
replicateAIP 
AIP Repository-
Archives 
Name of a 
collection 
for an 
archive 
automatic 
metadata 
Data can be specified in a contract 
for captureSIPAttributes 
AIP Repository-
Report 
Time period 
between 
updates for 
repository 
global 
configuratio
n 
Domain setup can specifiy period 
for automatically submitted policy 
AIP Audit-
Distribution 
Required 
storage 
locations 
for an AIP 
global 
configuratio
n 
Doman setup can specify storage 
locations 
Global Archive-
Email 
E-mail 
address for 
global 
configuratio
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Phase Attribute Meaning Form Policy Domain Refactoring 
notification
s 
n 
Global Archive-
Distribution 
Define 
storage 
location 
global 
configuratio
n 
Created during iinitdomain 
Global Repository-
Email 
E-mail 
address of 
repository 
administrat
or 
global 
configuratio
n 
 
SIP Archive-
CheckDup 
Flag for 
whether to 
check for 
duplication 
of a SIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Created by high-level PEP 
duplicateSIPCheck 
SIP Archive-
CheckMetadat
a 
Flag for 
whether to 
verify 
required 
metadata 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Created by high-level PEP 
validateSIP|AIPRequiredMetadata
, an example that can be left as a 
noop where not indcated 
SIP Archive-
CheckProtecte
d 
Flag for 
whether to 
check for 
protected 
data 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Can be set by high-level PEP 
checkForProtectedData 
SIP Audit-
Depositor 
Required 
SIP 
attribute 
automatic 
metadata 
Data can be specified in a contract 
for captureSIPAttributes 
SIP Audit-Sources Required 
SIP 
attribute 
automatic 
metadata 
Data can be specified in a contract 
for captureSIPAttributes 
SIP Audit-
CheckIntegrit
y 
Status flag 
set to “1” if 
an invalid 
checksum is 
detected for 
a SIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
 
SIP Audit-
CheckMetadat
a 
Status flag 
set to “1” if 
missing 
metadata is 
detected for 
intrinsic 
metadata 
High level PEP 
validateSIPRequiredMetadata can 
result in setting an invalid 
metadata state and halt SIP 
processing 
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Phase Attribute Meaning Form Policy Domain Refactoring 
a SIP 
SIP Audit-
CheckProtecte
d 
Status flag 
set to “1” if 
protected 
data is 
detected in 
a SIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
High level PEP 
checkForProtectedData can result 
in setting an invalid SIP contains 
protected data state and halt SIP 
processing 
SIP Audit-
CheckVirus 
Status flag 
set to “1” if 
a virus is 
detected in 
a SIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
High level PEP checkForVirus 
can result in setting an invalid SIP 
contains virus and halt SIP 
processing 
SIP Audit-
CheckVocab 
Status flag 
set to “1” 
when 
metadata do 
not comply 
with HIVE 
when 
loading a 
SIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
High level PEP 
validateSIPRequiredMetadata can 
result in setting an invalid 
metadata state and halt SIP 
processing 
SIP Audit-Comply Flag for a 
SIP or AIP 
denoting 
processing 
steps were 
passed 
intrinsic 
metadata 
This is captured by the state 
machine processing that will 
create a properly formatted AIP to 
deposit into the pickup window 
SIP Audit-
Description 
Description 
of a SIP or 
AIP 
automatic 
metadata 
Data can be specified in a contract 
for captureSIPAttributes 
SIP  Audit-
CheckFormat 
Status flag 
set to “1” if 
a bad data 
format is 
detected in 
a SIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
High level PEP 
validateSIPFormat can set an 
invalid format status 
SIP,AIP Archive-
Description 
Required 
description 
for a SIP or 
AIP 
user 
provided 
Validated by high-level PEP 
validateSIP|AIPDescription 
SIP,AIP Archive-
Format 
Required 
format for a 
global 
configuratio
Validated by high-level PEP 
validateSIP|AIPFormat allowing 
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Phase Attribute Meaning Form Policy Domain Refactoring 
SIP or AIP. 
There may 
be multiple 
allowed 
formats. 
n  curator to define site-specific 
formats 
SIP,AIP Archive-IPR Account 
that owns 
the 
intellectual 
property 
rights for a 
SIP or AIP 
user 
provided 
Can be set by high-level PEP 
assignIPRights 
SIP,AIP Archive-
Ontology 
Ontology 
name for 
designated 
community’
s collection 
for a SIP or 
AIP 
global 
configuratio
n  
Ontology value can be set in a 
high-level PEP assignOntology 
and validated 
SIP,AIP Archive-
CheckFormat 
Flag for 
whether to 
verify type 
of data 
format 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Created by high-level PEP 
validateSIP|AIPFormat, an 
example that can be left as a noop 
where not indcated 
SIP,AIP Archive-
CheckVirus 
Flag for 
whether to 
check for 
virus 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Can be set by high-level PEP 
checkForVirus 
SIP,AIP Archive-
CheckVocab 
Flag for 
whether to 
verify 
descriptive 
metadata 
comply 
with 
vocabulary 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Can be set by high-level PEP 
validateSIP|AIP|DIPMetadata 
SIP,AIP Audit-Handle Unique ID 
for a file, 
using 
Handle 
system 
automatic 
metadata 
High level PEP assignHandle can 
return this in the contracted output 
parameters 
SIP,AIP Audit-Access Read access 
restricted to 
automatic 
metadata 
High level PEP 
setSIP|AIPAccessRights can set 
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specifed 
accounts for 
an AIP or 
SIP 
these values 
SIP,AIP Audit-
CheckDup 
Status flag 
set to “1” if 
a duplicate 
file is 
detected 
when 
loading a 
SIP 
intrinsic 
metadata 
High level PEP 
duplicateSIPCheck can transition 
to an invalid/duplicate status and 
halt SIP processing 
SIP,AIP Audit-
Depositor 
Depositor 
of a SIP or 
AIP 
automatic 
metadata 
Data can be specified in a contract 
for captureSIPAttributes 
SIP,AIP Audit-
Ontology 
Ontology 
name for 
designated 
community’
s collection 
for a SIP or 
AIP 
automatic 
metadata 
Data can be specified in a contract 
for captureSIPAttributes 
SIP,AIP Audit-Source Source of a 
SIP or AIP 
automatic 
metadata 
Can be catured during the SIP 
ingest and AIP creation 
SIP,AIP,DI
P 
Archive-
Access 
Restrict 
access to 
specifed 
person 
automatic 
metadata 
Created by high-level PEP 
createAccessRestrictions 
SIP,AIP,DI
P 
Archive-
CheckIntegrit
y 
Flag for 
whether to 
check 
integrity 
intrinsic 
metadata 
Periodically invoked high-level 
PEP validateSIP|AIP|DIPIntegrity 
can be run as a noop or indicate 
successful validation 
 Audit-Date Date stamp 
for when a 
report 
should be 
updated 
global 
configuratio
n 
 
 Repository-
Course 
List of 
courses 
taken by 
repository 
staff 
global 
configuratio
n 
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member 
 Repository-
Devel-Date 
Date stamp 
for when 
the next 
developmen
t course 
should be 
done, in 
Unix format 
global 
configuratio
n 
 
 Repository-
Role 
Allowed 
roles: 
“Archive-
manager”, 
“Archive-
archivist”, 
“Archive-
admin”, 
“Archive-
IT” 
global 
configuratio
n 
Role setting can be part of the 
domain initialization 
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